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A Note from the Editor-in-Chief
Samuel D. Elzinga
What an honor it is to mantle the responsibility of editor-in-chief
for this edition of the UVU Journal of National Security. Filling this role,
I have at times felt quite inadequate when comparing myself to past
editors-in-chief, considering they are close friends and colleagues whom
I hold in very high esteem. Much like our country’s national security
landscape, however, the journal is constantly evolving. In the four semesters I have been involved with the journal, both as an author, managing
editor, and now editor-in-chief, I have witnessed the journal blossom
and grow into a publication that continually raises the bar of scholarship
both at Utah Valley University and the greater scholarly community.
This edition of the journal, however, is unique. It is the first time
we have published a piece from beyond the ranks of UVU students and
alumni, which was the next necessary and organic step for a journal of
this caliber. This journal is the result of hundreds of collective hours
spent on both the author and editor side to ensure the quality of this
publication remains consistent with previous journals.
For me, this transition would not have been possible without a fabulous roster of motivated and bright individuals to get the pieces ready
to publish. I would like to especially thank my executive editor, Bryce
Krieger, and my managing editors, Cierra Peters and Mason Taylor, for
their continued support and insight throughout the process of publishing this edition of the journal. Without them, keeping the strict deadlines a journal like this demands would have been impossible. I would
also like to thank Deb Thornton and her English class for the countless
class hours they spent to ensure the journal was ready to publish. Lastly,
I would like to thank our new faculty mentor, Dr. Gregory Jackson, for
his sage advice throughout the publication process and for sharing the
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vision to expand the journal beyond our university.
I am additionally excited to have the contributions of Major
General Jefferson Burton, Commanding General of the Utah National
Guard, and Dr. David McEntire, dean of the College of Health and
Public Service, in this journal. I am sincerely grateful for their willingness to share their expertise. In a time where rigorous discussion of
security challenges are necessary, I sincerely hope this publication continues to contribute to the timely and necessary discussions we must
participate in to ensure the best ideas are brought forth to solve these
complex problems.
Samuel Elzinga
Editor-in-Chief
Journal of National Security

Foreword: Honoring those Who Served Before,
75 Years Since the D-Day invasion

Major General Jefferson Burton, United States Army, Retired,
Former Adjutant General,
Utah National Guard
In a rapidly changing world, perhaps no topic is more relevant than
that of National Security. As a nation we face the complexities of providing effective security for our citizens, while at the same time protecting civil liberties. Maintaining this balance in a free society when facing
totalitarian regimes and non-state actors that have no such constraints on
power projection is the seminal challenge of our generation. The difficulties that we face, though not new, are multiplied by the rapid advancement and access to game-changing technology that make it difficult to
remain competitive.
It was our first President, George Washington who stated that “the
most important thing we can occupy our time with is “the education of
our children in the science of government.” As students of National
Security, we must be diligent in educating ourselves. Having spent much
of my adult life in the third world, I have found that there are enough
resources to feed and clothe all of mankind, but selfishness, greed and
bad governance make the distribution of these resources virtually impossible. As Americans, we should be engaged in finding solutions to,
first, ensure that we maintain our own Republic, and, second, that we
show others how to leave chaos behind and develop functionality and
stability of governance.
Our history is replete with great examples of personal self-sacrifice
in the defense of these principles. This year, we celebrated the 75th
Anniversary of the Normandy invasion, where thousands of young
Americans stormed heavily fortified beaches to retake Europe and end
Fascist oppression. Casualties were high, and thousands of our Soldiers
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are laid to rest in cemeteries on the French coast. At the entrance to
one of these cemeteries, the words of General Mark Clark are inscribed
as a reminder to the world of their sacrifice. He said,
If ever proof were needed that we fought for a cause and
not for conquest, it could be found in these cemeteries.
Here was our only conquest: all we asked was enough soil in
which to bury our gallant dead.

Our challenges are difficult ones, as we face aggressive peer competitors, non-state actors, and global transnational criminal organizations—all seeking to challenge the supremacy of the United States. It is
done at home through orchestrated social media assaults; it is done on
the high seas through piracy and the expansion of naval reach; and it is
done on land through conventional and guerilla border incursions, and
criminal organizations that seek to get gain by destabilizing and even
toppling governments. Now more than ever, it is critical that we are
ready as a nation to face these and other dynamic threats. The safety and
security of the world depend upon our willingness to face these complex challenges. No one has ever said it better than our third President,
Thomas Jefferson, when he stated:
I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against
all forms of tyranny over the mind of man.

May we re-dedicate ourselves to the maintenance of individual liberty
and collective freedom, which are the hallmarks of the American Republic.

The Dallas Ebola Incident as an Indicator of the
Bioterrorism Threat: An Assessment of Response
with Implications for Security and Preparedness
David A. McEntire, PhD and SFHEA

Introduction
In October of 2014, a man named Thomas Duncan traveled from
Liberia to Dallas, Texas. He was unknowingly infected with Ebola and
brought a very threatening disease to the United States. This, in turn,
presented serious challenges for hospital administrators and public
officials involved in the medical, public health, and emergency management professions. Consequently, the Ebola incident serves as an important illustration of what could happen in a potential bio-terrorism
attack and is therefore a significant case for those involved in emergency management, public health, national security and homeland security.
With this context in mind, the following article will discuss several
of the false assumptions made before and during the Ebola incident. It
will also identify other challenges encountered in the response as well
as recommended measures to better deal with the threat of such outbreaks or bio-terrorism attacks in the future. Before doing so, information about the methods for this article will be provided as well as background information on Ebola.

Methods
The findings of this article are derived from a study undertaken by
professors currently at Utah Valley University and the University of
North Texas.1 The purpose of the initial research was to explore how
1

The authors express appreciation to the National Science Foundation for
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government officials and emergency management personnel make decisions with limited information in dynamic and uncertain environments.
This initial research concentrated on how the Ebola case relates to the
concepts of spontaneous planning in emergency management and executive discretion in public administration. Qualitative research from this
prior study, which included newspaper articles, after-action reports, and
interviews with 20 key participants (mainly those working in emergency
management), was adapted for the purpose of this article. The data
collected revealed how the response to the Ebola incident succeeded
and where it fell short. The lessons learned will serve as the focal point
of the following article.

Background on Ebola
Previously known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Ebola is a rare and
deadly disease caused by infection of the Ebola virus strains (i.e., family Filvoridae, genus Ebolavirus). Ebola can affect non-human primates,
such as monkeys, chimpanzees, and gorillas, through the Reston virus
(Reston ebolavirus). Ebola may also impact humans through four strains,
including Zaire virus (Zaire ebolavirus), Sudan virus (Sudan ebolavirus), Taï
Forest virus (Taï Forest ebolavirus), and Bundibugyo virus (Bundibugyo ebolavirus). Symptoms in humans may appear anywhere from 2 to 21 days
after exposure, but the average is time of onset is between 8 to 10 days.
Symptoms include fever, severe headache, muscle pain, weakness, fatigue, diarrhea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and hemorrhaging of the
eyes, ears, nose, and mouth. If the virus is not treated quickly or with
proper medicines and sophisticated medical techniques, death is likely
to occur and the disease will spread.
For instance, one of the most concerning outbreaks of Ebola began in the African nation of Guinea on December 28, 2013, when a
two-year-old child died from hemorrhagic fever. By March 2014, 59
deaths in Guinea were attributed to Ebola, and cases were subsequently
reported in Liberia. Five months later, the World Health Organization
put the death toll at 3,091 people and announced that the fatality rate
was at an appalling 70%.
As this outbreak unfolded, a man named Thomas Duncan cared
for his landlord’s daughter, who was infected with the disease. A short
Award #1522547 and the IRB for Approval of Human Subjects Application
15-001.
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time later he boarded a plane from Africa and landed in Dallas, Texas,
on September 19, 2014. Duncan started to run a fever on September 24
and checked into the Presbyterian hospital the next day. Thinking that
Duncan had some strain of routine flu, doctors and nurses sent him
home. Duncan’s condition continued to deteriorate, and on September
28, Duncan returned to the hospital by ambulance and was isolated.
Two days later, tests confirmed he was infected with Ebola. On October 8, 2014, Duncan succumbed to the disease and passed away.
During Duncan’s treatment in the hospital, two nurses were also
infected. Nina Pham became the first person to be infected by Ebola
transmission in the United States. She developed a fever on October
10, 2014, and was isolated until she was declared Ebola free on October 24, 2014. Amber Vinson was another nurse who became concerned
about possible infection when she felt sick while traveling to Ohio to
make wedding plans. She returned to Dallas on October 13 and reported to the hospital on October 14. She tested positive the next day, was
treated, and declared Ebola free on October 22.
While the loss of Duncan’s life from Ebola was undoubtedly tragic
and the recovery of infected nurses was fortunate, the large numbers
of fatalities in Africa and the spread of the disease in the United States
certainly illustrated the serious nature of this outbreak. The Ebola episode severely challenged decision makers in the medical community and
in local/state government, and the costs associated with treatment and
response were substantial. Although this small occurrence in the US
proved to be extremely difficult, a wide-scale outbreak would clearly be
even more overwhelming. Learning from this case is therefore vital to
understanding the risk of bio-terrorism for those working for national
security, homeland security, emergency management, and public health.
Understanding the lessons of this incident may ultimately save lives in
the future.

False Assumptions
One of the greatest problems associated with the Ebola incident
was in relation to several false assumptions leaders had about disease
transmission, national preparedness, treatment protocols, and response
capabilities. Problems were witnessed in at least six areas.
1. Officials from various government agencies as well as President Obama
mistakenly assumed that the disease would not spread to other parts of
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the world. Their public comments indicate that they believed the disease ws only present in Africa and that existing airport screenings
would curtail the arrival of Ebola in the United States. No additional
travel bans were seriously considered.2 However, Dr. Thomas Frieden,
the Director of the CDC, admitted that in today’s world, “ultimately
we are all connected.”3 Rep. Edward Royce, Chairman of House Committee on Foreign Relations, also stated that because of the ease of
world-wide travel, it should be recognized that “communicable diseases
do not stop at borders.”4 Others likewise pointed out that our standards
for health screenings during immigration were too lax. Consequently, a
reporter from the Dallas Morning News noted that Duncan “evaded
all of the security measures in place to protect our nation from one of
the deadliest diseases on the planet.”5 One concerned citizen expressed
serious reservations about our immigration policies in a letter to the
editor:
i. When we sent men to the moon and back, we kept them in isolation for 30 days to prevent any unknown germ from infecting the
earth. Now, someone coming to the US from a region rife with
one of the most deadly and highly infectious diseases can just hop
on a crowded airplane, travel for hours and hop off to blend in
with the population.”6

Recognizing this threat, Senator Rob Portman of Ohio asserted that
this case “serves as a reminder of the need for increased US prevention
efforts,” such as screening at the point of entry in the United States.7
ii. A failure to take disease transmission seriously does not bode well
for national security, homeland security, emergency management,
2

Roberta Rampton, “‘Americans Can’t Give in to Hysteria or Fear’ Over
Ebola: Obama,” Reuters, October 17, 2014, https://reuters.com/article/us-helpebola-usa/american-can’t-give-in-to-hysteria-or-fear-over-ebola-Obama-idUSKCN0l61BO20141018.
3
Craig Schneider, “First U.S. Ebola Case Confirmed in Texas,” Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, October 1, 2014, https://www.ajc.com/news/national/
first-ebola-case-confirmed-texas/PfpG3dQTUi7fBRbjvOzg1M/.
4
Kelly Riddell, “After First Ebola Case, Red Flags Emerge That U.S. Unprepared for Pandemic: Federal Reports Raise Concerns U.S. Defenses Stagnated,
Waning,” Washington Times, September 30, 2014. https://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2014/sep/30/after-first-ebola-case-fears-turn-us-pandemic-prep/.
5
Tod Robberson, “The Common Link Between Ebola and the White House
Breach,” Dallas Morning News, October 1, 2014.
6
Bill Burris, “Letter to the Editor,” Dallas Morning News, 2014.
7
Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
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and public health.
2. Medical leaders also had incorrect beliefs about disease transmission.
Officials, including CDC Director Frieden, believed that “the virus does
not spread through the air—only through close contact with bodily
fluids from a sick person.”8 Accordingly, it was assumed that blood,
sweat, vomit, feces, urine, saliva, semen must penetrate skin or make
contact with a cut. However, a concerned citizen pointed out that the
CDC website reports that “if a symptomatic patient with Ebola coughs
or sneezes on someone, the saliva or mucus come into contact with
that person’s eyes, nose or mouth, [and] these fluids may transmit the
disease.”9 In addition, there was reason to believe that contaminated
bed sheets and clothing as well as the insertion of breathing tubes or
removal of protective gear could also spread the disease.10,11 Therefore,
it appears that there may have been insufficient knowledge about disease transmission in this particular case of Ebola.
3. Medical officials also seemed to be overly confident regarding their
ability to diagnose and minimize the spread of the disease. CDC Director Frieden stated, “I have no doubt we will control this case of
Ebola.”12 Others, such as Dr. Scott Ries of the Christian Medical and
Dental Association asserted that “we know how to deal with Ebola,”13
while Kyle Janek, Texas Health and Human Services Executive Commissioner, argued that “disease containment [. . .] is something we do
every day.”14 In spite of this confidence, various mistakes were made as
this event unfolded. Thomas Duncan “came to the emergency room
on a certain day saying that he felt sick, and mentioned that he had come
from Liberia. [. . .] The dots were not connected—sick African man
just got back from Liberia where there’s a major Ebola epidemic.”15
8
Marilynn Marchione, “5 Things to Know about the U.S. Ebola Case,”
September 30, 2014, https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/health/The-DallasEbola-Case-5-Things-to-Know-277677731.html.
9 Jacque Vilet, “Letter to the Editor,” Dallas Morning News, October 4, 2014,
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/2014/10/04/ebola-in-dallas/.
10
“Why Nation’s Top Docs Say.”
11
Nomaan Merchant, “Dallas Health Care Worker Tests Positive for Ebola,”
October 17, 2014, https://www.theadvocate.com/nation_world/article_bcf1b997466e-5c69-aa9c-86b62b8c7c48.html.
12
Schneider, “First U.S. Ebola Case.”
13
Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
14
Robert T. Garrett, “Texans Enjoy Strong Protections Against Ebola, Janek
Says.” Dallas Morning News, October 7, 2014, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/
politics/2014/10/07/texans-enjoy-strong-protections-against-ebola-janek-says/.
15
Todd J. Gillman, “Ebola: Dr. Fauci of NIH Says Dallas Hospital Should
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Furthermore, the hospital released him, and he was in the community
for two days. A reporter noted that “someone should have asked more
questions and didn’t. [. . .] They sent him home, and for the next three
to four days, the patient was contagious and exposed others to Ebola
in Dallas” (Robberson 2014).16 Dr. Daniel Varga, Chief Clinical Officer
with Texas Health Resources, commented, “Unfortunately, in our initial treatment of Mr. Duncan, despite our best intentions and a highly
skilled medical team, we made mistakes. We did not correctly diagnose
his symptoms as those of Ebola. We are deeply sorry.”17 Such errors,
while understandable, can have grave consequences.
4. Others mistakenly believed that the hospital would have no challenges
responding to the disease. For instance, “Edward Goodman, the infectious disease expert at the Dallas hospital, offered assurances that the
hospital has robust facilities and protocols to handle Ebola.”18 As time
unfolded, it was also conveyed by David Lakey, the Texas Health Services Commissioner, that “the man remains in strict isolation at the
Dallas hospital, which officials said is equipped to contain and care for
infectious diseases.”19 However, two nurses were infected while treating Thomas Duncan. The led Director Frieden to declare that “there
was a breach in protocol, and that breach in protocol resulted in this
infection.”20 However, as instructed, “the hospital worker [. . .] wore
protective gear while treating the Liberian patient. [. . .] The worker
wore a gown, gloves, a mask and shield while she cared for Duncan.”21
This led Director Frieden to apologize for his statement about the nurse
and comment that he felt awful that she had been infected.22 So, it appears that “the nation’s hospitals may be unprepared to deal with the
waste caused by Ebola patients.”23 Dr. Macgregor-Skinner states, “We
Have Admitted Duncan Right Away; ‘Tragic Mistake,’” November 21, 2014,
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2014/11/21/ebola-dr-fauci-of-nihsays-dallas-hospital-should-have-admitted-duncan-right-away-tragic-mistake/.
16
Robberson, “The Common Link.”
17
“Hospital Official: ‘We Are Deeply Sorry’ for Ebola Mistakes,” NBC News,
October 15, 2014, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/
hospital-official-we-are-deeply-sorry-ebola-mistakes-n227031/.
18
Schneider, “First U.S. Ebola Case.”
19
Schneider, “First U.S. Ebola Case.”
20
Merchant, “Dallas Health Care Worker.”
21
Merchant, “Dallas Health Care Worker.”
22
John Bacon and Marjorie Owens, “CDC to Change its Approach to Ebola
Virus,” USA Today, October 14, 2014.
23
Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
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have a long way to go—we are nowhere near ready yet.”24
5. Even the federal government overestimated its own understanding and
capabilities. The White House and CDC stated on many occasions that
the nation was prepared to deal with Ebola. Nevertheless, a local official stated, “The CDC did really not know what was going on.”25 The
after-action report also revealed that “agencies were receiving conflicting messages from the CDC throughout the event.”26 In addition, had
this been a broader event, the “DHS may not be able to provide sufficient [. . .] preparedness supplies to its employees to continue operations during a pandemic.”27 The Inspector General of the Department
of Homeland Security issued a report “warning that the Department
was woefully prepared for a pandemic, with expired medicines and inadequate resources to effectively equip its top responders in the field.”28
Consequently, one letter to the editor complained “as of the CDC’s
public reassurances about the sophistication of the US medical industry in dealing with the Ebola virus aside, I think it is better to know that
the CDC and medical system are woefully unprepared than to make
the dangerous false assumption that they are well-prepared.”29
6. The federal government may have also mistakenly assumed that the
local and state government capacity and knowledge would be sufficient. However, resources to deal with a crisis such as this are limited.
For instance, over 45,000 public health positions have been eliminated
since the 2008 financial crisis.30 There was also insufficient information
on how to deal with the Ebola incident. Local and state leaders were
constantly waiting for the federal government to step in with additional
direction, recommendations, and support. Sgt. Christopher Dyer, who
was involved in the implementation of quarantine order, said, “We were
really looking for the CDC to come in [and] take control of the situation.”31 An Assistant City Manager in Dallas said, “We thought the
24 Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
25
Rocky Vaz, interview. May 5, 2015.
26
North Central Texas Council of Governments. 2015. North Central Texas
Ebola After-Action Review. April. Arlington, Texas. https://resources.nctcog.org/
ep/News/AprilNewsletter.pdf.
27
Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
28
Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
29
James D. Beare, “Letter to the Editor.” Dallas Morning News. October 4, 2014.
30
Riddell, “After First Ebola Case.”
31
Bud Kennedy, “Jenkins, Dallas Courthouse Leaders Stepped up after a Slow
Start,” October 4, 2014, https://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/bud-kennedy/
article3876128.html.
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CDC was actually going to come in and really take the lead and tell us
what to do. [. . .] The cavalry didn’t come. One expert came for a few
days, then left, and never came back.32 A Dallas City Emergency Manager commented, “We thought the CDC would get here and there
would be some medical direction. [. . .] That was not something easily
or in some cases at all gotten from the CDC. We realized we are not
getting anything.”33 In spite of frequent meetings and conference calls,
Campbell stated that “we felt we were operating blindly. We didn’t have
the current science. We didn’t have current information.”34

Other Challenges with the Response
In addition to an excessive degree of confidence on the part of
some individuals and agencies, there were numerous other problems
evident in the response. First, the Ebola incident was a public health
emergency, but there was no legal mechanism to make that declaration
or structure the response organizationally. The Assistant City Manager
stated,
It is unique when you talk about something biological because the county charter basically gives authority to the
county as the health authority, and there is no seminal structure for something that is that broad based (like) [. . .] when
we have disasters. [. . .] There was never a formal emergency [. . .] as in other disasters when it is manmade or natural.35

A second and related problem was that there was a knowledge and
communication gap between the emergency management and public
health communities and the medical communities. Dallas Assistant City
Manager Eric Campbell noted that “we don’t have the technical health
expertise we need.”36 Rocky Vaz, the Director of the Dallas Office of
Emergency Management, also stated, “We as an EM community have
to have a better understanding about how the medical community
works.”37 Along these lines, there were too many delays in communication. The North Central Texas After-Action Review revealed that the
32

Eric Campbell (Dallas Assistant City Manager), discussion, interview, 2015.
Kevin Oden (Dallas Office of Emergency Management), in discussion with
the author, May 5, 2015.
34
Campbell, interview.
35
Campbell, interview.
36
Campbell, interview.
37
Vaz, interview.
33
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“usual emergency communication structure was not in place because it
was a “public health” emergency.38 Rocky Vaz reiterated that “I don’t
have that comfort level to wait for 4 days to call the state. I want to pick
up the phone and call the state. I want you now.”39 Others agreed. Kevin Oden of the Dallas Office of Emergency Management stated, “In a
highly infectious disease situation, we don’t have 16 to 18 hours to wait
to fig-ure out if the county is doing what they are supposed to do.”40
A third problem related to confusing media messages. Rocky Vaz
pointed out that working with the media was challenging. He said, “We
were telling everyone it is safe and then [in] the next picture frame is our
people in Hazmat suits going to clean up [the] dog.”41 Eric Campbell
agreed that the messages were contradictory: “There were images of
people on TV with PPE and Hazmat protective gear. And we are saying
it is not a big deal.”42 The North Central Texas After Action Review
stated that “there were several challenges with managing the media—
the content, accuracy, and timing of messages.” The After-Action Review also revealed that “authorities had to consult with their legal department on what and to who information could be released.”43
A fourth problem concerned politics. Whether founded or not, there
were allegations about racism due to treatment of Mr. Duncan. John
Wiley Price, a Dallas County Commissioner at the time, said, “We know
what happened at Presbyterian happened. It is historical what has happened in this community. If a person who looks like me shows up
without insurance, they don’t get the same treatment.”44 Such politics
compounded an already difficult situation.
A fifth challenge pertains to quarantines. Public officials had a very
difficult time determining whether a quarantine would be needed and
how to implement it. For instance, “officials didn’t immediately guard
38
39
40
41
42

North Central Texas, “Ebola After-Action.”
Vaz, interview.

Oden, discussion.
Vaz, interview.

Campbell, interview.
North Central Texas, “Ebola After-Action.”
44
Matthew Watkins, “John Wiley Price, County Health Director Emphatically
Defend Dallas Response to the Ebola,” Dallas Morning News, October 7, 2014.
http://www.ragingelephantsradio.com/john-wiley-price-county-health-director-emphatically-defend-dallas-response-to-ebola/.
43
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the apartment to make sure people who were supposed to be isolated
stayed inside.”45 Rocky Vaz of the Dallas Office of Emergency Management asserted that this quarantine “was just isolation tracking progress 21 days.”46 Even when this procedure was taken more seriously,
some of the nurses refused to be quarantined even though they could
have been infected themselves. This could have caused the disease to
spread rapidly and to more individuals, exacerbating an already challenging occurrence. The dilemma regarding personal freedom and public safety needs to be resolved.
A sixth problem relates to fear in terms of how to interact with
those who might be infected. People in the community were very concerned that they would be affected by Ebola if they interacted with the
victim or his family members. Rocky Vaz noted how the family was
potentially mistreated after receiving a bungalow from the Catholic Diocese in an isolated area. He said in an interview:
We asked the Red Cross to [. . .] go to Olive Garden and get
food for the family. The sheriff set up their command 300
yards away and they said “we are not getting anywhere near
there.” So, we had this Red Cross guy with an Olive Garden
bag. He drove up the long drive, parked his car, put the food
on the table and one of the kids opened the door and said
“hi and thanked him.” They guy took off and called national headquarters in D.C. and said the Red Cross is not going
to feed them anymore. [. . .] They said they would drop it off
outside the gate about 400 yards away. [. . .] We also called
the White House and did a no-fly zone over the Dioceses so
the media could not see where we took them.47

Based on this treatment, the Dallas Emergency Manager believed
“they were treated like they were [. . .] Lepers. Everyone stared at them
like they had Ebola.”48
Medical waste, decontamination, debris removal, transportation, and
disposal were other challenges identified during the response. Several
individuals commented on this problem:
• Dr. Macgregor-Skinner noted that “Ebola patients create an enormous
45
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amount of waste that is [. . .] highly infectious.”49
For instance, Atlanta’s Emory University was involved in the treatment
of patients. It was reported that “as many as 40 bags of waste were generated each day, which placed a huge burden on the hospital’s waste disposal system.”50
Similar problems were evident at the victim’s residence. The Dallas Assistant City Manager stated, “We were not sure at all about what level of
decontamination was needed. We knew we had to do some level of
clean-up, but we didn’t have expert advice.”51
Regarding the victim’s home, the Director of the Office of Emergency
Management stated, “We chopped up everything including the TV. We
had 90 barrels. [. . .] It had sheets and clothing and mattresses. It became
medical waste. [. . .] It took us 8 hours and 14 city employees to get the
house . . . [cleaned].”52
Once the medical debris was collected, transporting it became a serious
problem. The Dallas Assistant City Manager noted that “you need a special license to transport HAZMAT waste.”53 Unfortunately, there was
disagreement about what type of license would be needed. Riddell reported that “the DOT classifies Ebola as a Category A agent,” but “the
CDC, however, [categorizes it] as regulated medical waste.”54
The OEM Director also mentioned the urgency related to this transportation issue. He said, “We are getting pressure from the mayor because
CNN and everybody else is looking around and seeing 90 barrels of
medical waste inside. [. . .] So we told the mayor you have to call Secretary Fox.”55 The issue was later resolved with the leader of the US Department of Transportation.
Others experienced similar problems. “Conflicting classifications on Ebola waste forced the hospital to wait for the US Department of Transportation to issue a special permit before it could move the material.”56
Once the transportation permits had been obtained, additional problems
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Sharon Begley, “Ebola Waste Disposal Has Proven a Thorny Issue: CDC,”
Reuters, October 4, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-usawaste-idUSKCN0HT0P520141004.
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became evident. According to the Dallas OEM Director, “The city found
contractor in Missouri, but it got to a level of politics where the Governor stepped in and said you are not bringing Ebola waste here. [. . .] Then
we found someone in Port Arthur to take it, but they would only take
90-gallon barrels. We had 45-gallon barrels. We put the 45-gallon barrels
in the 90-gallon barrels [and] transported it with an escort. Then the truck
got a flat tire at 2:00 a.m.”57

Such problems with medical waste will need further attention in
the future.
Finally, dealing with Thomas Duncan’s dog proved problematic.
The Dallas Office of Emergency Management “got implicit direction
[from politicians] that you are not going to get rid of [put down] the
dog.”58 However, there was no “playbook” on how this should be done.
The Assistant City Manager noted that they were “talking to veterinarians across the state and the universities asking [them if it can be] transmitted to a dog, can a dog transmit it to another human. [They said,]
“Well, we don’t think so, but I am not going to tell you unequivocally
that is cannot happen.” [. . .] We even had people come up and say ‘I’ll
take the dog,’ but you still have the issue of not knowing how it is transmitted.”59 Eventually, Texas A&M brought a mobile vehicle to the
house so two vets cleaned the dog and fed it three times a day. The
Director of the Dallas Office of Emergency Manager said “that must
have cost the state about $200,000 to take care of the dog.”60

Conclusion and Recommendations
As can be seen, the Ebola incident in Dallas, Texas, created countless challenges for those working in homeland security, emergency
man-agement, public health, and hospitals. This was in spite of the fact
that the incident affected a relatively small number of people. The
spread of the disease was limited to two nurses, and those involved
should be commended for their tireless efforts to treat patients and
deal with the multitude of challenges that were continuously presented.
However, because a larger outbreak would certainly magnify these challenges, several lessons must be seriously considered.
57
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First, medical and public officials must have correct assumptions
about the spread of Ebola (and other disease outbreaks and bioterrorism threats). This includes views about disease transmission, national
preparedness, treatment protocols, and response capabilities.
Second, increased efforts must be given to build preparedness and
response efforts in the private sector and at all levels of government.
Hospitals must do more to prepare for contagious diseases, and there
must be further coordination between emergency management and public health organizations.
Third, those involved with disease outbreaks and potential bioterrorism threats must resolve special concerns, such as communications,
media messages, politics, quarantines, treatment of victims, debris management, pets, etc.).
Finally, public officials must pay attention more to effective decision making when disease outbreaks occur. Interviewees noted that
they were constantly bombarded with limited/changing information
and complex problems, and they had to make split second decisions
about how to save lives and react effectively to unfolding concerns.
Should these and other measures be undertaken, the nation will
ultimately be in a better position to prevent the spread of diseases and
react should an unthinkable bio-terrorism attack occur in the future.
Those involved in national security, homeland security, emergency
management, and public health can take steps to protect our citizens
and improve response operations.
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Terrorism and Its Legal aftermath: The Limits on
Freedom of Expression in Canada’s Anti-terrorism
Act & National Security Act
A. Percy Sherwood

Introduction
On the bright autumn morning of October 22, 2014, Michael
Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Cpl. Nathan Cirillo at the National War
Memorial in Ottawa, Canada. Zehaf-Bibeau then entered the parliament buildings, where he exchanged gunfire with security personnel.
He was shortly killed by Sergeant-at-Arms Kevin Vickers. In response
to the shooting, former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said
that “extreme jihadists have declared war on us, on all free people, and
on Canada specifically.”1
Canada introduced the controversial Anti-terrorism Act of 20152
(commonly known as Bill C-51) in the aftermath of the shooting; the
Act created sweeping changes to Canadian security laws. In particular,
Bill C-51 introduced a speech offense contained in s. 83.221 of the Criminal Code that made it illegal to communicate statements that advocate
or promote the commission of terrorism offenses in general.3 Much of
1
Stephen Harper, “Archived—PM Announces Anti-Terrorism Measures to
Protect Canadians” (January 30, 2015): Government of Canada News Releases, available
at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2015/01/pm-announces-anti-terrorism-measures-protect-canadians.html>.
2
Bill C-51, An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the
Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential
amendments to other Acts, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015 cl 20 (assented to 18 June 2015)
[Bill C-51], available at: <https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6842344&Language=E>.
3
Bill C-51, supra note 2. Also see: Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 83.221, as
amended by An Act respecting national security matters, RS 2019, c 59, s 143. The speech
offense in Bill C-51 provides as follows: “Every person who, by communicating
statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism
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the scholarship about Bill C-51 has focused on the need for standards
regarding the collection of personal information and methods to enhance the compliance of independent review procedures.4 Less attention has been paid to questions regarding whether the offense infringes
upon freedom of expression and, if it does, whether this restriction on
speech is legitimate under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5
This analysis aims to demonstrate how s. 83.221 in Bill C-51 is
likely to violate freedom of expression guaranteed under the Charter.
The first section employs the two-step Irwin Toy6 analysis to show that
the speech offense infringes upon s. 2(b) of the Charter. The second
section uses the Oakes7 test to determine whether the breach of freedom of expression is a reasonable limit. The Oakes analysis shows that
(i) preventing terrorist acts from taking place is of sufficient importance to warrant overriding freedom of expression guaranteed under s.
2(b), and (ii) there is a rational connection between the objective of the
prevention of terrorist acts and the prohibition of the advocacy and
promotion of “terrorism offenses in general.” (iii) However, the speech
offense does not impair freedom of expression as little as possible.
There are existing offenses that prevent terrorism and are more closely
connected to direct harm and violence; (iv) further, there is not an
overall proportionality between the effects of the speech crime and the
costs to freedom of expression because of its chilling effect on speech.
Section three of this paper argues that the amendments contained in
offenses in general—other than an offense under this section—while knowing that
any of those offenses will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of
those offenses may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of
an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than
five years.”
4
Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian
Anti-terrorism (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015); Daniel Alati, Domestic Counter-Terrorism in
a Global World: Post-9/11 Institutional Structures and Cultures in Canada and the United
Kingdom (London: Routledge, 2017); Michael Geist, Law, Privacy and Surveillance in
Canada in the Post-Snowden Era ed. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2015).
5
Section 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. Section 2(b) states that everyone has
the right to “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication.”
6
Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), 1989 1 SCR 927 [Irwin Toy].
7
R v Oakes, 1986 1 SCR 103 [Oakes].
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Part 7 of the National Security Act 8 (also known as Bill C-59) are improvements to the speech crime in Bill C-51 because they are more
likely to satisfy a proportionality test.

I. The Irwin Toy Test
1. Is s. 2(b) of the Charter infringed by the speech crime in Bill C-51?
Canadian courts have interpreted freedom of expression as defined
in the Charter quite generally and often easily find a breach.9 Irwin Toy
provides a two-step analysis used to determine whether there has been
an infringement upon freedom of expression. In the first step, Irwin Toy
establishes that activity is expressive if it attempts to convey a meaning.10 The guarantee of freedom of expression protects all content of
expression, except for speech that incites violence and threats of violence, as outlined in Irwin Toy.11 Moreover, Chief Justice Dickson found
in Keegstra that communications that intend to promote hatred against
identifiable groups are protected under s. 2(b) unless they are expressed
in a violent form.12 However, the advocacy and promotion of terrorism
offenses in general do not fall within the scope of direct incitement or
acts of violence. For instance, boasting about radical ideologies could
presumably be considered an offense only if such speech is directly
inciting violence against an identifiable group. Section 83.221 thereby
represents an infringement of s. 2(b).
2. If so, does the government’s restriction on it infringe s. 2(b), in purpose or
effect?
The second step distinguishes between purpose-based and effectsbased restrictions on expressive activity. Purpose-based restrictions
control the content of expression (e.g., hate speech) and effects-based
restrictions control the physical consequences of the activity, regardless
8
Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019 cl
13 (assented to 21 June 2019) [Bill C-59], available at: <https://www.parl.ca/
legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=9057418&Language=E.> Also see: Criminal Code,
RSC 1985, c C-46, s 83.221.
9
Department of Justice, “Section 2(b)—Freedom of Expression” (June 17,
2019): Government of Canada, available at: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/
rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art2b.html>.
10
Irwin Toy, supra note 6 at para 42.
11
Irwin Toy at para 43.
12
R v Keegstra, 1990 3 SCR 697 at para 35 [Keegstra].
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of the content.13 The prohibition in s. 83.221 represents a purposebased restriction on speech in terrorist instruction and participation.
This restriction therefore prevents the communication of expression
and meets the second requirement of the Irwin Toy test. To summarize,
the speech crime constitutes an infringement of the Charter guarantee
of freedom of expression. The next step of this analysis examines
whether such an infringement is justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter as
a reasonable limit.

II. The Oakes Test
Oakes has become a central model for how to interpret the Charter,
particularly in providing for an interpretive methodology to assess justifiable limitations on Charter rights.14 The case has been cited by courts
in Australia,15 Ireland,16 South Africa,17 and the United Kingdom,18 which
suggests that Oakes has gained international significance for constitutional law. In Canada, the four-pronged Oakes test is used to determine
whether an infringement of a right is a “reasonable limit” that can be
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” under s. 1 of
the Charter.19 This paper applies the Oakes test to the speech offense.
The speech crime fails at the third and fourth step of the test: it does
not minimally impair freedom of speech as little as possible, nor is there
proportionality between the prevention of terrorist acts and the costs
to free expression.
1. Is the objective of the measure that limits freedom of expression “sufficiently important” to warrant the limit?
Parliament’s objective for the security provisions is based on the
13

Irwin Toy, supra note 6.
Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of
Proportionality Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34: 19 The
Supreme Court Law Review at 503.
15
Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth, 1998 HCA 22.
16
Blascaod Mor Teoranta v Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland, 1998 IEHC 38.
17
S v Singo, 2002 4 SA 858.
18
A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004 UKHL 56.
19
Charter, supra note 5 at s. 1. Section 1 states, “The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”
14
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prevention of terrorism.20 Khawaja establishes that the prevention of terrorism is rooted in the significant harm that acts of terror can cause.21
In this context, preventing terrorist acts from taking place is of sufficient importance to warrant overriding freedom of expression guaranteed under s. 2(b).
2. Is there a “rational connection” between the objective of the measure that
limits freedom of expression and the means chosen to achieve it?
There is a rational connection between the objective of the prevention of terrorist acts and the communication of terrorism offenses in
general. There is a logical connection between ensuring that individuals
(e.g., vulnerable youths) are not incited or counselled to commit an act
of terrorism through banning such speech. The dissenting opinion in
Keegstra offers a slightly contrary position. Justice McLachlin, as she was
then, argues in her dissent that the public may perceive the suppression
of expression by the government with suspicion, which allows for the
possibility that hate propaganda could be seen as containing an element
of truth.22 However, an analysis of ISIS publications shows that its
communication materials are misleading and sensational, and they contain vast overgeneralizations and inaccuracies.23 These materials are used
to avoid addressing “the messy nuances of complex political issues” in
order to influence and mobilize their audiences.24 It is unlikely that a
“reasonable person” would see propaganda disseminated by terrorist
organizations as containing basic truths, nor would such speech contribute to a marketplace of ideas.
3. Does the measure impair the freedom in question as little as possible?
The speech crime does not impair freedom of expression as little
as possible. Several other offenses carry out the governmental objective
of preventing terrorism that are more closely connected to direct harm
20
Department of Justice, “About the Anti-Terrorism Act” (July 26, 2017):
Government of Canada, available at: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/ns-sn/
act-loi.html>.
21
R v Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69 at para 55 [Khawaja].
22
Keegstra, supra note 12 at para 103.
23
Greg Simons, “Brand ISIS: Interactions of the Tangible and Intangible
Environments” (2018) 17: 4 Journal of Political Marketing at 346.
24
Sarah Sobieraj and Jeffrey M. Berry, “From Incivility to Outrage: Political
Discourse in Blogs, Talk Radio, and Cable News” (2011) 20: 1 Political Communication at 20.
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and violence. Dickson writes in Keegstra that section 1 “should not
operate in every instance so as to force the government to rely upon
the only mode of intervention least intrusive to a Charter right or freedom.”25 Dickson explains that the government may use a more restrictive measure “if that measure is not redundant, furthering the objective
in ways that alternative responses could not, and is in all other respects
proportionate to a valid s. 1 aim.”26 In this respect, introducing the
advocacy and promotion of terrorism offenses in general is redundant.
These offenses already overlap with existing crimes set out in the 2001
Anti-terrorism Act; they include threatening, instructing, and counselling terrorist activity.
Moreover, the phrase “terrorism offenses in general” is difficult to
interpret since it is not defined in Canadian law. It is unclear as to how
it differs from “terrorist activity,” which already exists in the Criminal
Code. Unlike the pre-existing crimes, “terrorism offenses in general” does
not narrowly define crimes that are closely linked to violence and harm.
For example, an ISIS recruitment video initially posted on YouTube
features Canadian Andre Poulin saying that people who go to the territory that his group formerly controlled in Syria “will be very well taken
care of here—your families will live here in safety just like back home.”27
This statement does not directly threaten violence, but it could be captured under advocating or promoting terrorism offenses in general. An
individual who reposts or publishes this statement could also possibly
be charged under the speech offense, which is not closely connected to
the direct incitement of violence. The government can pursue its objective of preventing acts of terror through less rights-invasive means
by using existing offenses such as threats, instruction, or counselling of
terrorist activity, which are more closely connected to actual violence.
In this context, the speech crime does not satisfy the minimal impairment test.
4. Is there proportionality—or an overall balance—between the effects of the
measure and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance”?
25

Keegstra, supra note 12 at para 135.
Keegstra.
27
Michael Schmidt, “Canadian Killed in Syria Lives On as Pitchman for
Jihadis” (July 15, 2014): New York Times, available at: <https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/07/16/world/middleeast/isis-uses-andre-poulin-a-canadian-convertto-islam-in-recruitment-video.html>.
26
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The offense has the objective of preventing terrorist acts. However, the effects of the speech crime disproportionately outweigh the costs
to freedom of expression. The chilling effect on speech is immense. In
particular, the offense could disproportionately affect certain minority
groups in Canada. McLachlin writes in Khawaja that “police should not
target people as potential suspects solely because they hold or express
particular views. Nor should the justice system employ improper stereotyping as a tool in legislation, investigation, or prosecution.”28 Racial
profiling is significant, considering that existing research about representations of terror shows that Islam and Muslims are regularly associated with violent extremism and this negative attention is linked to
increased prejudice against Muslims and Arabs in general.29 The securitization of Muslims and Arabs in the War on Terror in Canada has also
resulted in increased national security and police profiling amongst these
communities.30 This research suggests that the speech offense could
have a direct chilling effect on Arab and Muslim communities in their
legitimate exercise of speech due to the increased scrutiny that these
marginalized groups face.
Other literature suggests that the speech offense could have counterproductive effects for outreach involving Muslim communities in
counter-violent extremism (CVE) programs that engage those who have
deeply felt grievances and may be inclined to use extremist rhetoric.31
The speech offense could also help drive extremist speech underground, consequently making it difficult for CVE programs and intelligence agencies to detect.32 The effects of the speech crime designed to
28

Khawaja, supra note 21 at para 83.
Henrik Andersen and Jochen Mayerl, “Attitudes Towards Muslims and Fear
of Terrorism” (2018) 41: 15 Ethnic and Racial Studies; Keon West and Joda Lloyd,
“The Role of Labeling and Bias in the Portrayals of Acts of ‘Terrorism’: Media
Representations of Muslims vs. Non-Muslims” (2017) 37: 2 Journal of Muslim
Minority Affairs; Mahmoud Eid and Karim H. Karim, eds, Re-imagining the Other:
Culture, Media, and Western–Muslim Intersections (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014).
30
Amanda L. Smith and Susan E. Mason, “The Age of Racial Profiling in the
Context of Terrorism” (2016) 21: 2 Modern Psychological Studies; Uzma Jamil, “The
War on Terror in Canada: Securitizing Muslims” (2016) 1: 2 Journal of Islamic and
Muslim Studies; Wayne Hanniman, “Canadian Muslims, Islamophobia and National
Security” (2008) 36: 4 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice.
31
Forcese and Roach, False Security, supra note 4 at 314.
32
Forcese and Roach.
29

26

UVU Journal of National Security

promote Parliament’s objective thereby do not outweigh the costs to
freedom of expression.

III. Amendments in Bill C-59
The Part 7 of Bill C-59 amends the crime of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offenses in general into a “counselling” offense.33 Canada’s Privacy Commissioner told the Senate that
this law is “fairly balanced and clearly an improvement.”34 Indeed, the
“counselling” offense is more likely to satisfy a proportionality test. This
investigation finds that speech that does not directly threaten violence
or harm could be captured under the speech crime. In addition, radical
boasting would not likely be captured in the amendments because these
statements do not directly incite violence against an identifiable group.
For example, the statement made by Poulin that people “will be very
well taken care of ” in now-former ISIS-controlled territory advances
an extreme argument, but it does not directly threaten violence. Despite it being a disreputable claim, the listener is left to decide whether
the claim has merit.
This analysis also finds that the effects of the existing speech crime
do not outweigh the costs to freedom of expression due to the possible
chilling effect on Arab and Muslim communities. McLachlin raises a
relevant argument in Keegstra that “theories of a grand conspiracy between government and elements of society wrongly perceived to be
malevolent can become all too appealing if government dignifies them
by completely suppressing their utterance.”35 A free and democratic
society certainly should not criminalize unfavorable ideas. The amendments reduce the chilling effect for those holding deep grievances with
the state by allowing those individuals to engage in discussion if they
33

Bill C-59, supra note 8; Criminal Code, supra note 8 at s. 83.221. Section 83.221
of the Criminal Code states “Every person who counsels another person to commit
a terrorism offense without identifying a specific terrorism offense is guilty of an
indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five
years.”
34
Daniel Therrien, “Appearance before the Senate Standing Committee on
National Security and Defence (SECD) on C-59, An Act Respecting National Security
Matters” (April 29, 2019): Privacy Commissioner of Canada, available at: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/advice-to-parliament/2019/
parl_20190429/>.
35
Keegstra, supra note 12.
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are not directly inciting violence.
Finally, the amendments improve way they convert the concepts of
advocacy and promotion into the existing offense of counselling others
to commit a terrorism offense. Counselling or inciting others to carry
out an act of terrorism is traditionally understood to be a crime and is
an established concept in the Criminal Code.36 The concepts of advocacy
and promotion of terrorism offenses in general are exceptionally vague
in how they set out to further Parliament’s objective in ways that counselling, instructing, and threatening terrorist activity cannot.37 The new
Bill removes the offense of advocating or promoting terrorism offenses in general and replaces it with a counselling offense.38

Conclusion
One of the dangers of enacting legislation in the aftermath of terrorism events is overreacting to the threat. Bill C-51, including its broad
speech offense, is indicative of such a forcible response. The Act presents a serious challenge to the established rights and freedoms of
Canadians.39 This heavy-handed approach to security echoes the emergency use of the now-repealed War Measures Act of 1914 during the
1970 kidnapping of the British trade commissioner in Montreal, a past
overreaction to the threat of terrorism that unduly compromised fundamental freedoms.40
Of the problematic elements of Bill C-51, this investigation has
shown how the speech crime contained in this Act is likely to violate
36

Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, “A Report Card on the National Security
Bill” (June 22, 2017): Institute for Research on Public Policy.
37
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association has stated that Bill C-59’s counselling offense includes a “clearer and more appropriate legal structure surrounding
them, and this change limits the risk of uncertainty, overbreadth, or a chilling
effect on protected speech.” Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “The Terrorist
Speech Offense and Bill C-59” (September 12, 2017): Canadian Civil Liberties
Association, available at: <https://ccla.org/terrorist-speech-bill-c-59/>.
38
Criminal Code, supra note 8 at s 83.221.
39
Forcese and Roach, False Security supra note 4 at viii.
40
Forcese and Roach, at 30–31. The now-repealed War Measures Act provided
for emergency measures in wartime. As Forcese and Roach argue, the War Measures
Act “authorized the warrantless arrest of those who police had ‘reason to suspect’
where members of any unlawful association.” Like Bill C-51’s terrorism speech
crime, the War Measures Act speech crime was “an indictable offense subject to five
years imprisonment” (30–31).
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s. 2(b) of the Charter. The two-step Irwin Toy test shows that the speech
offense violates freedom of expression. On whether the speech offense
can be justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit, the legislation fails at the third and fourth step of the Oakes test. On step three,
the speech offense does not impair freedom of expression as little as
possible because statements that do not directly threaten violence or
harm are likely to be captured. On step four, the effects of the speech
crime also disproportionately outweigh the costs to freedom of expression because the speech offense has a chilling effect, specifically on Arab
and Muslim communities. The amendments to the speech crime in Bill
C-59 are improvements over the speech crime contained in Bill C-51 as
they convert the concepts of advocacy and promotion into the existing
offense of counselling others, which is an established concept in the
Criminal Code. The revised speech offense in Bill C-59 clarifies these
overly broad concepts and, in doing so, adequately addresses the one
of many constitutional flaws in Bill C-51.

China’s Impact on US National Security
Nicole Nielsen

Introduction
China and Africa have been long-time diplomatic partners,1 but
recently, these relations have explored new heights.2 The changes have
taken place across many sectors: humanitarian aid, trade, personnel training, student exchanges, even military. According to the Council on Foreign
Relations, “China has participated in energy, mining, and telecommunications industries and financed the construction of roads, railways, ports,
airports, hospitals, schools, and stadiums.”3 Additionally, Chinese funds‚
both private and state, have been put towards tobacco, sugar, sisal, and
rubber plantations.4 While many see China’s providing funding as a
positive action—helping a continent that has long been the epitome of
poverty and the third world—there are strong negative ramifications.
Not only does it cripple Africa and stunt its economic growth,5 it also
impacts United States national security. Many in Africa believe China’s
aid is done out of the goodness of its heart. Larry Hanauer and Lyle
Morris of RAND Corporation, a global policy nonprofit, note in their
article China in Africa: Implications of a Deepening Relationship, “Many
1

Larry Hanaur and Lyle J. Morris, “China in Africa: Implications of a Deepening Relationship,” RAND Corporation, 2014, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_briefs/RB9760.html.
2
David H. Shinn, “China’s Economic Impact on Africa,” Oxford Research
Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, March 20, 2019, https://
oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/
acrefore-9780190228637-e-831.
3
Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, July, 12,
2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa.
4 Deborah Brautigam, Will Africa Feed China? (Oxford University Press, 2015), 8.
5 Shinn, “China’s Economic Impact on Africa.”
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African leaders believe that as a fellow developing country, China has
more altruistic motives than Western governments and corporations
do.”6 While this may be the perspective among many leaders throughout the region, it can be argued that China’s relationship with Africa has
many negative side effects that not only impact the African countries,
but also US national security. The effects on US national security are
demonstrated by the growth of the Chinese economy through its relations with Africa. The negative impacts can also be seen in Africa’s
increased dependence on China and the increase in corruption in many
of the governments throughout all of Africa.
The diversity of the countries across the continent of Africa should
be noted. From South Africa to Egypt to Mali to Chad, each country
has its own set of natural resources, its own terrain, its own people,
unique to each country. It does not do the countries or continent justice to clump them all under one label of “Africa.” However, for purposes of this paper, Africa will refer to the entire continent as a whole,
as China’s relations have had affect across the giant land mass.

China’s Economy
The economic growth China has experienced through its relations
with Africa are a concern for US national security. China’s relations and
partnership with various African countries have been hugely stimulating to the Chinese economy, as “trade between Africa and China has
grown at a breathtaking pace. It was $10.5 billion in 2000, $40 billion in
2005 and $166 billion in 2011. China is currently Africa’s largest trading
partner, having surpassed the US in 2009.”7 The United Nations’ magazine, African Renewal, published an article called “China in the Heart of
Africa,” which shows the impact on China’s economy. It states, “In an
article in This Is Africa, a Financial Times publication, Sven Grimm and
Daouda Cissé state that in recent years China’s economy at times has
grown at more than 10 percent a year.”8 This partnership has been very
beneficial for China, increasing its economic power. With increased
Chinese economic power comes a stronger threat to the United States.
Without the power of economy, China would not be a force with which
6
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to be reckoned. These quotes, however, show that its economy is booming and should be taken seriously. A strong economy gives China the
power to carry out potential national security threats.
It is well known that China’s behavior has been increasingly provocative to the United States. Some examples of such behavior are the
building of artificial islands in the South China Sea, increasing its naval
and military capacity, and constructing additional battleships, etc.9 All
of this is expensive, and the economic benefits China gains from relations and trade with Africa help to fund these actions. These actions are
a threat to many countries, including the United States and other Southeastern Asian countries; they allow China to continue to build threats
and potentially carry out more aggressive actions.
Another problem this poses for the United States is the lack of
entry into African markets. China passed the United States as Africa’s
number one trade partner. In an article titled “Why Africa Matters to
U.S. National Security,” Grant Harris states the: “In the long run, the
strength of the U.S. economy will, in some way, depend on the interest
and capacity of American businesses to operate in Africa, as well as
the willingness of African consumers to purchase American goods
and services.”10 He also notes that “other countries—and particularly
China—are outpacing the United States, seizing economic opportunities that could otherwise be contributing to U.S. growth and jobs.”11 The
countries within Africa are vital to the progression of the US economy.
Without building the partnerships on the continent and increasing trade,
the United States will be lagging behind, as China continues to grow
economically and further its political influence.

Africa’s Increasing Dependence on China
With the immense amount of aid that has been given to countries
on the African continent, many nations have become very reliant on
China. This, as has been noted, stifles Africa’s ability to grow and to
develop. It also spreads Chinese interests and mentality throughout the
9
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entire continent. Examples of the spread of influence are noted in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China’s article,
“China–Africa Relations,” which states, “Continuing to grant scholarships to African students every year to study in China, the Chinese
government hosted various study and training courses to help African
countries forming professional contingents.”12 These classes include “the
classes of advanced-studies for both Chinese and African management
personnel and the training courses for young and mid-aged African
diplomats.”13 The article continues,
China also organized study-tours for high-ranking African
diplomats to visit China and exchange experiences. China
announced to establish an African Human Resources Development Fund during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation—Miniserial Conference 2000 to help African countries train more professionals of different disciplines.14

China is taking drastic measures to build a dependent relationship
with African countries. Some may think this is done out of China’s
good will, as China calls its approach to this partnership “no strings
attached.” This implies the aid given requires no quid pro quo; nothing is
demanded in return. It can be argued, however, that there are other
motives and expectations behind it. China is making these countries
dependent on China, which gives China power and leverage, allowing
China to advance its objectives. Typically, these objectives are in conflict with United States’ interests.
Some African people have recognized these ulterior motives and
noticed the impact on their people. They have protested Sino–African
relations and how involved China has been with African affairs. Morris
and Hanauer of RAND Corporation state,
Some in Africa, however, are critical of Chinese engagement.
Labor unions, civil society groups, and other segments of
African societies criticize Chinese enterprises for poor labor
conditions, unsustainable environmental practices, and job
displacement. In their view, China perpetuates a neo-colonial relationship. . . . In some countries, resentment at Chi12
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nese business practices has led to popular protests and violence against Chinese businessmen and migrants.15

As an attempt to improve China’s image with disgruntled Africans,
“Beijing has adjusted its policies to assuage Africans’ concerns and put
the Sino–African relationship on a more balanced footing. These modifications include . . . the promotion of Chinese soft power, culture, and
people-to-people exchanges.”16 These alternative methods do not address the people’s concerns and protests. Hanauer and Morris state that
these modifications are ways to improve relations with the African people. On the contrary, these adjustments are merely ways to increase
Chinese influence and way of thinking on the African continent.
The spread of a Chinese way of thinking and Africa’s dependence
on China are harmful to US national security; they pose the threat of
communism spreading. It can almost be viewed as China doing the
same thing as the United States did after World War II: The Marshall
Plan. The United States aided Europe and built up weak countries to
look more like the US, to prevent the spread of communism and to aid
in the spread of democracy. The works of China in Africa can be seen
as the same thing, only in reverse. The Chinese version of the Marshall
Plan is being furthered by taking over the news in Africa. Kingsley Ighobor from African Renewal explains,
Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, has increased its bureaus in Africa to more than 20. Yu-Shan Wu, a researcher
at the South African Institute of International Affairs, sees
a broader motive. “China is actively introducing its culture
and values,” she says, and calls the push “the rise of China’s
state-led media dynasty in Africa.”17

Knowing China is infringing on African news should be concerning to many, as it is clear China is trying to control the message being
conveyed to the public.
The impact of China’s infringement on African news can already be
seen in Africa’s support of Chinese policies. According to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “African countries firmly support China in its endeavor for national unification. And
15
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most of them support China’s “one China” policy.”18 Furthering this
point, in an article “China in Africa by Council on Foreign Relations,”
Eleanor Albert states, “Experts from Aid Data, a research lab at the
College of William & Mary, found a link between Chinese assistance
and the alignment of recipient countries with Beijing’s UN voting and
its One China principle.”19 This policy expands China’s power and territory, acknowledging that Taiwan is a part of mainland China. While
the United States recognizes the One China policy, it also acknowledges Taiwan and has informal relations with it, limiting China’s power.20
African countries that have received Chinese aid recognize China as
the sole power and Chinese government, which contributes to Chinese
expansion. The support of Chinese policies continues because of the
dependence Africa has on China.
Additionally, Africa’s dependence on China grows with the many
generous loans China has given to many African countries. African debt
to China is increasing, again, allowing China power over these countries.
David Shinn, former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia,
writes in Oxford’s Research Encyclopedia, “African governments welcome Chinese loans, which are usually used for infrastructure projects,
but there are signs these loans are contributing to a debt problem in an
increasing number of countries.”21 This debt and feeling of obligated
loyalty increases with donations and assistance described in the United
Nations’ magazine African Renewal:
China had either donated or assisted in building a hospital
in Luanda, Angola; a road from Lusaka, Zambia’s capital, to
Chirundu in the southeast; stadiums in Sierra Leone and
Benin; a sugar mill and a sugarcane farm in Mali; and a water supply project in Mauritania, among other projects. At
the fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in Beijing in July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao listed yet
more, including 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria
centres and 20 agricultural technology demonstration centres.22
18
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Clearly, China is leaving its mark on the countries of Africa by controlling the media and creating African dependence. This is damaging
the African economy in that it is not self-sufficient and “saddled with
giant piles of debt.”23 Without China, Africa’s economy has potential
for an extreme crash, as it has “alienate[d] people who were willing to
help”24 with such high reliance on the Chinese help. Some leaders in
African governments are recognizing this and calling for change. African Renewal makes the point that catastrophe is looming as dependence
increases, “South African President Jacob Zuma warned in July that the
current ‘unbalanced’ trade pattern is unsustainable.”25 This is a justified
fear. This lopsided partnership cannot continue forever. As Africa’s reliance and debt to China is racking up, a crash seems inevitable.
The situation is problematic for the United States. As China increases its power over these countries and maintains leverage over
them, the African countries are at the mercy of the Chinese government. This progresses Chinese objectives, which hinders those of the
United States. As African debt increases, so does the risk of an economic collapse. With a crippled economy, this would leave plenty of
room for anarchy, corruption, and violence, as will be discussed further
in the following section.

Corrupt Governments
The corruption of many governments in Africa is no secret to the
international world, as is noted in the Council of Foreign Relations article, “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in which Stephanie Hanson
notes, “Africa is widely considered among the world’s most corrupt places, a factor seen as contributing to the stunted development and impoverishment of many African states. Of the ten countries considered most
corrupt in the world, six are in sub-Saharan Africa.”26 Adding to the
discussion of a crippled African economy, according to BBC Africa
analyst, Elizabeth Blunt, corruption costs the continent roughly $150
23
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billion a year.27 This corruption is seen by African leaders making deals
for their own benefit, keeping money and profit for themselves, perpetrating human rights violations, and doing other inappropriate and unacceptable behaviors. Again, from the Council of Foreign Relations’ article
“China in Africa,” Albert says, “China’s activity in Africa has faced criticism from Western and African civil society over its controversial business practices, as well as its failure to promote good governance and
human rights.”28 Relations with other countries, including the United
States, are limited because of actions by leaders and governments. China,
however, does not hold its allies or partners to the same standard.
The West African country of Guinea-Bissau has a perfect example
of a corrupt government. Having personally been to this country, I
have witnessed this corruption firsthand and how China influences it.
In a personal interview I had with a native to Guinea-Bissau and a local
activist, Macote Ambrozio, he described the impact China has on his
home country. He’s experienced the inequality created by his corrupt
government. He states that government leaders make deals with China
to export much of its cashew plant and mangos. The Chinese pay the
government officials for access to these resources at a very low cost to
China, and the money is paid directly to the government officials instead of to the country. China then sells them internationally and makes
all the money from Guinea-Bissau’s resources.29 Guinea-Bissau is not
the only corrupt government that is gaining from Chinese partnerships.
Transparency International explained, “Several Chinese companies, including the Chinese Energy Fund Committee, the telecommunications
firm ZTE and the China Roads and Bridge Construction Company,
have been accused of bribing senior government officials in Chad and
Uganda, Zambia and Kenya.”30 China’s partnership with Africa cripples
the African economy through corrupt governments.
Of the many obvious problems with corrupt governments, one
of the biggest currently affecting Africa is that of stunted economies.
China aids in this by preventing growth to many industries on the
27
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continent. As stated in Oxford’s Research Encyclopedia, “The influx
of inexpensive Chinese products is also stifling Africa’s ability to produce similar goods.”31 The efforts of China, its loans, and the products
it is introducing to African markets are causing local job displacement
and costing natives their livelihood.32
Corrupt African governments want to engage in relations with
China specifically for personal strategic reasons, but not for the people
of the country. According to Hanauer and Morris, “Good-governance
watchdogs warn that China negotiates unfair deals that take advantage
of African governments’ relative weaknesses and that foster corruption.”33 The deals made by China with African governments allow for
the perpetuation of corruption. Hanauer and Morris continue,
To some degree, many African leaders hope that China will
interact with them in ways that the United States and other
Western governments do not—by engaging economically
without condescendingly preaching about good governance,
for example, or by investing in high-risk projects or in remote regions that are not appealing to Western governments
or companies.34

The leaders get all the “benefits” from China’s partnership without
any demand for improving or overcoming corruption, which clearly
poses a threat to United States national security. China is allowing Africa
to perpetuate mistreatment of its people and human rights violations.
China allows the leaders of governments to continue to seek gain for
themselves while causing their people to suffer in poverty and hunger.
Building such relations with the United States and other countries would
requ]ire Africa to respect human rights and uphold the democratic process. This would strengthen US national security and form more alliances for the United States, giving access to strategic locations on the
African continent, while also improving conditions and treatment of
the African people and disposing of corrupt governments.
Another danger to corrupt governments is the inability to lead,
which leaves room for terrorism to breed. Charles B. Holmes, co-director of the Center for Global Health and Quality and visiting associate
31
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professor of medicine at Georgetown University, discusses this issue:
“Africa is home to several states teetering on a fragile edge, with unstable political, economic, and security conditions characterizing much of
the Sahel region, including Mali, Chad, South Sudan, and the Central
African Republic. These countries are increasingly home to terrorist cells
linked to Al-Qaeda and other networks.”35 Of course, as China fosters
this kind of corruption, terrorism continues to grow, which expands the
ongoing terrorist threat to United States national security. Such terrorist groups have targeted the United States several times before. Grant
Harris states, “African-based groups such as Boko Haram—the second
most lethal terrorist group in the world—and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) espouse dangerous anti-American and/or anti-Western ideologies.”36
Though there are some that say the Sino–African relationship poses no threat to the United States, these terrorist groups are one example
that proves them wrong. The Chinese continue to support corrupt
African governments, decreasing their ability to govern, leaving plenty
of space for dangerous terrorist groups. This is a serious threat to not
just the United States, but the rest of the world, as well.

Conclusion
Some acknowledge the China–African relationship as a zero-sum
relationship and a problem for US national security. Still, others claim
this partnership benefits all involved and that there is no effect on the
United States, a position Hanauer and Morris support: “While China’s
‘no strings attached’ approach may foster inefficient decision making
and official corruption, Chinese engagement does not fundamentally
undermine U.S. economic and political goals on the continent.”37 Their
argument is
Chinese-built infrastructure helps reduce businesses’ operating costs and expand the size of regional markets, increasing opportunities for profitable ventures by indigenous and
35
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U.S. investors. U.S. and Chinese approaches and interests do
not inherently contradict each other, and U.S. officials, including Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, have
denied that Washington and Beijing are engaged in a “zero
sum” competition for influence and access in Africa.38

While it is true there are some benefits of the Sino–African relationship to African countries, it is not true that the United States is left
unaffected. As has been stated throughout this paper, the growth to
China’s economy through African partnerships threatens US national
security. It allows China to continue to build its military and disrupt the
South China Sea. This partnership also increases Africa’s dependence
on China, leaving these countries at the mercy of China. This increases
China’s power, allowing it to spread communism and Chinese objectives.
Lastly, the Sino–African relationship fosters corruption and breeds terrorism. For obvious reasons, this is dangerous to many parts of the
world, especially the United States and its allies, as they are often targets
of terrorism.
Because of these very real and prevalent risks to the United States,
it is necessary to start acting against the negative aspects of Sino–African relations. Africa is too big a player to leave for China to control.
Again, from Holmes makes a crucial point, “How Africa grows and
evolves today will not only shape the future of the African continent, it
will also shape the future of the world.”39 If the United States steps in
too late, these African countries will have already chosen the Chinese
side, posing a huge threat to US national security. Ignoring the potential
harm of the Sino–African relationship could prove catastrophic for the
United States of America.
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Command Versus Commerce: Comparing and
Analyzing the Post-World War II Economies
of Eastern and Western Europe
Brandon Amacher
The second World War was one of the greatest man-made catastrophes in human history. The conflict wrought a truly unprecedented level of both physical and economic destruction across the European continent. After the war, the nations of Europe were faced with the
daunting challenge of rising from the ashes and attempting to rebuild
their once-strong economies. The people of Europe were desperate
for relief, and theories and opinions on how to do provide them succor
varied immensely. The once widely accepted ideology of free market
economics faced a serious threat in the form of growing support for
the command economic systems of socialism and communism. While
these ideas were not new, they now posed a more imminent threat.
Marxist ideologies had gained significant support in the early twentieth
century, even to the point of being adopted in some eastern parts of
Europe, most notably in the Soviet Union. These distinct ideologies not
only differed from the status-quo free markets of the west in thought,
but also in the outcomes they produced. The respective economic recoveries of the capitalist nations of Western Europe and those under
communism in Eastern Europe provide a significant case study as to
the effectiveness of the policies and ideologies that determined their
disparate courses. This paper will undertake to prove that the use of
market economies and free trade in Western Europe were the primary
reasons for its superior post-WWII recovery when compared to the
command economies of Eastern Europe. This will be done by analyzing the extent of economic destruction following the war, investigating
and analyzing the differences in recovery policies in the East and the
Weat, particularly the Marshall Plan, and analyzing the respective degrees of success in the two regions.
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To understand the recoveries of the nations of Europe clearly, the
extent of the economic devastation it experienced during the war must
first be understood. Before the war, some of the most powerful economies in the world resided in the Western part of the continent. For
centuries, the colonial empires of Great Britain and France had essentially ruled the world. This prosperous past, however, was not enough
to shield them from the devastation of World War II.
Before the war, the economy of France was among the strongest
on Earth. In 1939, the year the war broke out, France boasted a Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of 199 billion dollars (at 1990 price level)
with a GDP per capita of $4,424. For reference, this per capita number
was about 72% of the per capita GDP of the United States at the time.
Following the war, France’s economic output had decreased by almost
50 percent, with GDP falling to only 101 billion dollars in 1945. Also,
France’s new GDP per capita in 1950 represented only 55 percent of
the value of the GDP per capita of the United States at the same time.1
To put this into perspective, an economic loss of this scale would be
comparable to the modern-day United States losing the combined economic output of California, Texas, New York, Florida, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and Ohio.2
Britain also experienced economic strife as a result of the war but
not to the same extent that France did. This disparity can be partially
attributed to the fact that, with the exception of bombings, no battles
were fought in mainland Britain. Nevertheless, Britain’s economy was
hit hard by the conflict. In 1939, the British economy boasted a GDP
of about 300 thousand Geary-Khamis Dollars (GK). Following the
war, the GDP of Britain had increased to 327 thousand GK in 1947.3
These numbers may seem to constitute a positive change due to the
fact that the economy continued to grow; however, when compared to
past performance, it is clear that these numbers represent a significant
1
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downturn in the British economy. Over this period the GDP growth
rate of Britain was only around 1.5% annually whereas over the previous eight years the economy had grown at a rate of 3.75% annually.4
This data constitutes a significant downturn in British economic prowess. These numbers are even more staggering when compared to the
United States, another combatant that did not experience conflict on
their home soil, whose economy grew at an average of 7.2% annually
over the same period.5 Despite their economy not shrinking, this significant decrease in growth illustrates just how devastated the island nation was despite not experiencing a ground invasion.
Nations in the eastern part of Europe were no better off than their
western counterparts. Economic data from Eastern Europe in the early
twentieth century is scarce, and information regarding some major nations, like Poland, is not readily available or not very reliable. The data
for the nations with statistics available, however, tells a horrific tale. In
1939 Bulgaria had a GDP of about $10.6 billion. By the end of the war
in 1945, the nation’s GDP had dropped to only $7.5 billion.6 In other
words, during the war, thirty percent of the nation’s economy had simply
vanished. Hungary had also been ravaged by the war, seeing their GDP
drop from about $26 billion in 1939 to $15.6 billion in 1946.7 Hungary
had lost an even greater portion of their economy to the war ,with over
40% of their output having been utterly destroyed.
The once-robust economies of Europe were in shambles. The threat
of Fascist invasion may have passed, but new threats of hyperinflation,
massive debt, decimated infrastructures, and fiscal uncertainties now
oc-cupied nearly the entirety of the continent. The region had to start
the long and painful process of rebuilding, and ideas varied widely on
what economic systems and practices would best alleviate the suffering
of the people of Europe. One of the prevailing ideologies relied heavily on the free market economic philosophy of Adam Smith. This philosophy had been the predominant system of many European nations
for some time, and its ideology essentially posits that free markets will
typically self-regulate and achieve allocative and productive efficiency
through free trade of goods and private property ownership. The
4
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theory of free-market capitalism is based on the idea that people are
rational and self-interested; it further assumes that typically when people act upon these motivations, total societal well-being increases. On
the other side of the argument, the followers of Karl Marx’s communist and socialist ideologies believed that capitalism inherently led to
the oppression of the working class and an unacceptable level of inequality in society. Under a communist system, private property does
not exist, and the government is the sole decision-making body when it
comes to the regulation of the economy and interactions. The government decides the quantity of goods produced and the amount of goods
allotted to each individual in society.
During the first part of the twentieth century, contingents of these
two ideologies existed in nearly all European nations. Both traditional
capitalist and communist parties had followers and competed for seats
in legislative bodies ranging from British Parliament to the Reichstag.
However, it was not until 1917 that communism attained a real foothold as the Bolsheviks seized control of the Russian government. The
formation of the USSR, and its subsequent expansion, rapidly spread
communism through much of Eastern Europe. Following the Second
World War, the territory conquered by the Allies was essentially divided
into two spheres of influence, each dominated by a world power: the
American-led free markets of the West, and the Soviet-command economies of the East.
The United States had experienced highly atypical economic results from the war. Because the war had not touched the continental
United States, the nation not only did not experience economic downturn, but it had indeed seen its economy bolstered by the war effort.
The already-formidable US economy had now become a behemoth,
especially compared to its significantly weakened European counterparts. The suffering of Europe did not go unnoticed by the Americans.
The destruction of Europe was indeed of great concern to the US, as
was the potential spread of communism. In an effort to combat these
crises, the Truman administration undertook the most ambitious foreign aid program in human history, the Marshall Plan.
Although the plan is sometimes portrayed as a purely benevolent
act on the part of the Americans, in reality, the motivations behind the
plan were a mixture of strategic and altruistic factors. As Diane Kunz
explains in her article, “The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex
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of Motives,” the plan had many factors that led to its creation. The
primary factors cited by Kunz are the United States had a vested interest
in having stronger allies in Europe, the United States wanted, literally,
to buy an increased measure of influence in the region and, the Americans believed that maintaining a positive image of the capitalist United
States would stop the spread of communism and prevent communist
parties from obtaining more power in Europe.8 Clearly, the motivations
behind the plan were not as simple as they are often presented to be.
At the time, the idea of sending millions of dollars overseas to help
rebuild Europe was neither universally accepted nor popular. Many
in the general public and in high levels of government were not convinced of the necessity of such large amounts of foreign aid. The
swaying point for many skeptics came in the form of a speech given by
Secretary of State George Marshall, which was has not been intended
to be nationally released. Invited to speak at an alumni association event
at Harvard University in 1947, Marshall decided to speak on the need
for American intervention in the European economic crisis. The speech
would go on to be published and distributed by the State Department
and is often seen as the beginning of the process that eventually led to
the Marshall Plan. In the speech, Secretary Marshall outlined the need
for American assistance in Europe, saying,
In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of
Europe the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of
cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated,
but it has become obvious during recent months that this
visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. [. . .] The
rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite
evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort
than had been foreseen.9

Marshall went on to explain that the need for help was not only the
need for monetary infusion in order to help the economies of Europe
to get back on their feet, but also a need of a source of confidence to
8
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kick start economic cooperation across the whole of Europe. Marshall
drove this point home by saying,
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring
the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The
manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be
able and willing to exchange their products for currencies
the continuing value of which is not open to question.10

The quotation illustrates another area in which the plan was far
more complex than many realize. The Marshall Plan was not simply
handing out of a few billion dollars in the hopes that it would help
Europe bounce back, but it marked the beginning of a new American
doctrine when it came to the markets of Europe, under which the increased integration and cooperation of the economies of Europe would
be fully backed.
Following the speech, deliberations began as to how to put these
concepts into action, and after months of debate and modifications,
the Marshall Plan finally became more than just an idea. The Foreign
Assistance Act and the Economic Assistance Act constitute the hard
documentation of the plan and were passed in 1948. The Foreign Assistance Act states that its purposes are three-fold:
(1) promoting industrial and agricultural production in said
countries;
(2) furthering the restoration or maintenance of the soundness of European currencies, budgets, and finances; and
(3) facilitating and stimulating the growth of international
trade of participating countries with one another and with
other countries by appropriate measures including reduction
of barriers which may hamper such trade.11

Again, it is reiterated in the text of the law that the purpose behind
the plan is not to singularly to transfer money to Europe in the hope
that it would stabilize the situation, but that the plan was intended to
make Europe integrate economically, knock down trade barriers, and
unify. The creation of a unified democratic Europe that shared a love
of free trade and capitalism was not only an unintended consequence
10
11

Marshall, “The Marshall Plan Speech.”
Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, H.R. 169, 80th Cong. (1948).
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of the plan but the central purpose for its creation.
The list of nations offered money under the Marshall Plan was surprisingly inclusive, including nations that had not been directly involved
in the war, such as Switzerland. It also offered aid to Eastern European
nations under Soviet influence and the Soviet Union itself, but all of
these nations declined the aid; many were compelled to decline by their
Soviet superiors.12 The nations that accepted and were granted aid included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, France, Greece, West
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The total amount
of aid distributed from 1948 to 1951 was about 12.7 billion dollars,
with Britain and France as the largest beneficiaries, receiving 3.3 and
2.3 billion, respectively.13
Although at first glance these numbers may seem to represent large
quantitates of capital, upon further inspection it is clear that the aforementioned 12.7 billion could not possibly be the sole cause of the
remarkable economic recovery that took place in Europe following the
war. To explain, between 1947 and 1952 the GDP across nations that
received Marshall Plan aid grew by about 384 billion dollars.14 In order
to produce this amount of economic growth, a government spending
multiplier (a number used in economics to correctly weigh the impact
of spending on GDP) of slightly over 25 would be required; in reality,
government spending multipliers typically range between -0.5 to about
2.5 per the International Monetary Fund.15 This is to say that in order
for the infusion of capital to account for the totality of the growth, the
spending multiplier would have to be more than ten times larger than
the uppermost point on the range put forth by the International Monetary Fund, which is essentially impossible,16 which means that the
12
Geoffrey Roberts, “Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the
Onset of the Cold War, 1947,” Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 8 (1994): 1371–1386.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668139408412234.
13
New World Encyclopedia, “Marshall Plan.” https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Marshall_Plan#Expenditures.
14
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15
Batini, Nicoletta, Luc Eyraud, Lorenzo Forni, and Anke Weber. “Fiscal
Multipliers: Size, Determinants, and Use in Macroeconomic Projections.” International Monetary Fund, (September 2014): 8. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
tnm/2014/tnm1404.pdf.
16
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growth created by the Marshall Plan was clearly not attributable to the
expenditures alone. Again, this was never its purpose. The creators of
the Marshall Plan knew that the influx of capital would not be enough
to remedy the economic woes of Europe; the money was simply a means
to an end which was the greater economic integration and cooperation
in Europe. The establishment of organizations such as the European
Economic Community and European Coal and Steel Community, in
1957 and 1951, respectively, indicated the attainment of this end. Regardless of the motivations behind the Marshall Plan, however, it was
immensely successful.
The Eastern Bloc, on the other hand, was not receiving the same
treatment from their Soviet neighbors. On the contrary, many Eastern
nations (particularly former Axis powers) not only were not receiving
aid from the USSR, but they were actually being forced to pay large
reparations to the USSR. East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Finland,
and Austria all had to pay large sums to the USSR in addition to shipping large amounts of resources and supplies to them.17 From these
forced reparation payments, the USSR received nearly as much money
as the United States gave to Europe in total under the Marshall Plan.18
The Soviets were extremely concerned about the nations that were under their sphere of influence being lured into cooperation with the US
because of the assistance the US had given its allies. Soviet paranoia was
the justification behind not allowing Soviet satellite states to participate
in and receive funds from the Marshall Plan. The formation of a unified community in the West resulting from the Marshall Plan further
concerned the USSR and led to the creation of COMECON (Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance), which was meant to mimic the economic communities of the West, but in reality it was simply another
means by which the USSR controlled its neighbors. Stalin did not, in
“Statistics on World Population,” online supplement to Historical Statistics of the
World Economy 1-2008 AD, (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm);
New World Encyclopedia, “Marshall Plan”; https://www.newworldencyclopedia.
org/entry/Marshall_Plan#Expenditures; Batini et al., “Fiscal Multipliers.” [It
should also be noted that Iceland and Czechoslovakia are left out of these
calculations due to lack of GDP data.]
17
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18
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reality, consider these satellite states as allies but more as a buffer zone
between the USSR and the West, and, therefore, he felt no need to treat
them with high regard.
The differences in the relationships between the superpowers and
their allies does not end there. The USSR had chosen to take a position
of absolute power over its neighbors while the United States assumed
a leading, but not overtly controlling, role. In addition, the Soviet command system inherently afforded more control over economic functions and trade to the central governing body, in this case the general
secretary and top party officials of the USSR. Stalin initially exerted
strong control over the nations surrounding him in order to create a
buffer zone between the USSR and the West. As has been noted above,
Stalin believed that these states would prove to be an economic asset
for the USSR, but maintaining this imperial control came at a cost. Due
to the USSR’s neglect of the economies of Eastern Europe, the soviet
satellite states quickly turned from potential assets into liabilities. As
Valerie Bunce noted,
First, the Soviets established political and economic dominance in the region by creating derivative regimes headed by
externally dependent elites; as a result, the Soviet role within
the bloc has eventually evolved from one of coercion to
one of captivity. The rubles expended to hold the bloc together were not just a serious drain on the Soviet economy.
They were also spent without any guarantee of achieving
their stated objectives, that is, enhancing the political and
economic solvency of the region.19

Over the years, the price of Soviet control of the region increased
to the point of becoming unsustainable. Economic pressure would prove
to be one of the factors in the eventual downfall of the USSR.
The data concerning the varying degrees of success points to a
clear supremacy of Western policy over that of the East. In the Western
part of the continent, the cooperation between the free markets yielded
stunning economic recoveries. In France, the five years following the
war were an economic explosion, with the GDP of the nation more
19
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than doubling from $102 billion in 1945 to $220 billion in 1950.20 Currently, France has one of the largest and healthiest economies in the
world. With the tenth-largest GDP in the world at $2.85 trillion and a
GDP per capita of $44,100, France has once again assumed a position
of great importance on the global economic stage.21
Likewise, the United Kingdom was able to recover at an astonishing pace. Within the 15 years following the war, the British economy
grew 33% in size.22 The UK has been able to maintain steady economic growth over the last 50 years with a GDP growth rate that has seldom been negative. The UK currently boasts the tenth-largest economy in the world with a GDP of $2.925 trillion.23 Western Europe is
currently a beacon of development and economic success to the world
and has managed to rebuild their infrastructures and nations into something truly marvelous to behold.
Eastern Europe, however, did not have such luck during their stint
of communist control. Heavy reparation payments and air-tight governmental economic controls did not allow the booming recoveries that
were seen in the West. Additionally, Eastern Bloc nations were less incentivized to do trade with one another due to individual production
quotas and lack of competition. Economic data from the Eastern Bloc
tells the story of just how much these practices slowed growth. From
1950–1956 the nations of Western Europe outpaced the nations of
Eastern Europe by approximately 1% GDP growth annually.24 This difference is significant, especially considering the sizeable difference in
the sizes of the economies of the two regions. During the span of
1950–1960 the combined output of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia was smaller than the individual GDP of France or Britain on their own.25 The difference not only
in size but also in respective rate of growth illustrates just how far in
the dust the East was in comparison to the West.
20
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Until 1991, these patterns continued to affect the nations of Eastern Europe in a detrimental manner, but with the fall of the Soviet
Union and the subsequent dissolution of soviet satellite states, the economic communities and cooperative nature of Western Europe began
to welcome the nations of the former communist bloc. Additionally,
upon the fall of the USSR, the majority of Eastern Bloc governments
were replaced by more democratic and capitalist counterparts, changes
that brought a significant period of growth in the Eastern Europe. In
1992, the combined GDP of the aforementioned seven Eastern European nations equaled only 52% and 59% of French and British GDP,
respectively, whereas in 2008, the output of the Eastern European
nations was equivalent to 72% of French and 71% of British GDP.26
Eastern Europe is on the rise, and its increased rate of growth since the
change from communist to capitalist systems and their subsequent addition to organizations such as the European Union is no coincidence.
The economic crisis following the second world war was just as real
and, in many ways, equally as dire as the war had been for the citizenry
of Europe. Some of the world’s greatest powers had been brought to
their knees. Economies had been reduced to shadows of their former
selves, and GDP losses of 30–50% were commonplace among the
nations of the continent. The task of recovering from the war was
daunting, and the continent was split along eastern and western lines.
In the East, communist-controlled economics were adopted, and these
economies were characterized by central governmental planning, government set production quotas for each industry, government resource
allocation to individuals, and limited and often coerced interchange of
goods and services among nations. In the West, free markets and free
trade among nations were the defining characteristics of the chosen
economic theories. While the West experienced an immense economic
boom, the nations of the East lagged behind and struggled to keep up
with the growth and prosperity of their Western counterparts.
The juxtaposition of the economies of Eastern and Western Europe following the second world war provide valuable insights into the
efficacy of the systems implemented. Clearly, the market economies of
the West outperformed the command economies of the East during
the 45-year period between the end of the war and the fall of Eastern
communism. Furthermore, the supremacy of the Western system is
26
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evident in that since the nations of the East have adopted more Western economic practices and joined Western Economic communities,
the momentous gap in prosperity East and the West has begun to close.
Often, the gap in the initial success between the East and the West
has been written off as a direct result of the capital allotted to many
Western nations as part of the Marshall Plan. This paper, however, has
clearly elucidated the fact that these capital allotments were disproportionately small when compared to the resulting economic recoveries.
Additionally, it has been made clear that the primary objective of the
Marshall Plan was never simply to infuse capital into Europe, but to
encourage economic cooperation and the implementation of free markets in order to foster economic recovery and success. The attainment
of these goals and the implementation of these systems are the reason
why the Marshall Plan is hailed as the most successful economic recovery plan ever put into effect. These simple concepts of free trade, economic cooperation, and integration were the primary causes of the
most impressive economic recovery on record in the West while the
lack thereof caused the implosion and downfall of an empire in the
East. When presented with the challenge of building or rebuilding an
economy, the world should look upon these examples and remember
what caused the success and the failures of the nations of Europe,
particularly, that the use of market economies and free trade in Western
Europe were the primary reasons for its superior post-WWII recovery
when compared to the command economies of Eastern Europe.
The United States in particular should draw from the lessons learned
from these two regions and their respective success and failure. The
application of these post-war policies used in Western Europe could
prove critically valuable to the United States and her allies in terms of
stabilizing and rebuilding war-torn regions. The Marshall Plan and its
accompanying ideas and policies not only helped rebuild the economies
of Western Europe, they created stability and strengthened American
influence in the region. The application of this doctrine in regions that
are not as philosophically comparable to the United States as Western
Europe was may not create the same type of strong alliances with democratic and economically stable nations but would likely still yield an
increased measure of stability and prosperity. If a region is willing to
implement free-market principles and engage in trade with its neighbors,
it is in the United States’ best interest to encourage them to do so.

The “Taiwan Acts” and the Case for Strong
US–Taiwan Relations
Joseph Chowen

Introduction
The political status of the island of Taiwan has been in dispute since
the end of the Chinese Civil War.1 This Civil War was fought off and
on from 1927 to 1949 between the Communist Party of China (CPC)
led by Mao Zedong, and the nationalist Republic of China (ROC), led
by the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and Chiang Kai-shek.2 The end of the
war saw Chiang and the nationalists expelled to Taiwan while the CPC
controlled Mainland China.3 The communists founded a new government, The People’s Republic of China (PRC), and claimed ownership
over all of China (including the nationalist stronghold in Taiwan) while
Chiang and his forces continued to consider themselves as the rightful
government and claimant to Chinese territory.4 This has resulted in the
status quo of two de facto states, each regarding themselves as the only
government of a single China, which has created political tensions that
are still felt today. As the PRC continues to grow economically and militarily, this complicated situation affects the political stability and future
of the Chinese/Taiwanese people, has regional impacts in East Asia,
1
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Council, Republic of China (Taiwan). https://www.mac.gov.tw/MAIRC/cp.
aspx?n=B64DFEE4D7371490&s=AC4A64318B66ADCA.

54

UVU Journal of National Security

and national security implications for the United States.5 The United
States currently recognizes the PRC as the government of China6 though
it maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act,7 and the Taiwan Travel Act of 2018.8 However, it benefits
the United States to maintain a strong relationship with Taiwan to promote democracy and defend US geopolitical interests of a liberal, rules
based international system; a system the PRC has undercut through
aggressive economic and military expansion.9 This paper aims to examine the history of US relations with the PRC and Taiwan, including the
text and implications of the two aforementioned “Taiwan Acts,” and
finally why a robust US–Taiwan relationship is in the best interest of
the United States.

History of US–Sino Relations 1927–1979
In 1927, the Island of Taiwan and most of Mainland China were
under the control of the nationalist Republic of China and Chiang Kaishek.10 The United States, ideologically opposed to communism and
the CPC, officially recognized the ROC.11 Chiang’s distrust of the growing CPC was high, and he feared that they would take over China,12 so
during that same year he turned his forces on the CPC. Thi+s is widely
5
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Power,” BBC News, October 26, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45948692.
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7
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considered the start of the Chinese Civil War.13 The Civil War was interrupted by the Japanese invasion of Chinese territory in 1937, during
which The United States provided military support to the united Chinese forces.14 After the end of World War II, Taiwan held China’s seat
at the United Nations and enjoyed military relations with the United
States through the “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States
and the Republic of China.”15 The treaty granted the United States “the
right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about
Taiwan [. . .] as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.”16 The United States followed through on this and in
1954 deployed ground and naval assets to Taiwan to dissuade the communists. The US continued to maintain close ties with the ROC until
the 1970s, when, seeking to exploit a division between Soviet Russia and
the PRC, the US normalized relations with the PRC and later swapped
their recognition of the government of China from the ROC to the
PRC in the “Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China.”17 Part of the communique states:
The United States of America recognizes the Government
of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United
States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China and the United States of America reaffirm
the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai
Communique and emphasize once again that:
13
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Both wish to reduce the danger of international military
conflict. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific
region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries
to establish such hegemony.18

Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other
states. The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part
of China.19
This had three significant impacts. First, The United States recognized the PRC as the sole government of China. Second, The United
States was allowed unofficial communications and relations with Taiwan. Finally, the United States and the PRC would agree to not seek
hegemony over the Asia Pacific region. As formal recognition of the
PRC changed the US political view of China, this monumental communique leads directly to the next era of US and China-Taiwan relations, with the 1979 passage of the Taiwan Relations Act.

The Taiwan Relations Act, Third Communique, and Six
Assurances
While the United States recognized the PRC as “China”, it still
shared relations and military alliances with Taiwan. To rectify this, in
April of 1979 President Carter signed perhaps what is the most important legislation regarding US Foreign Policy with China-Taiwan: the
Taiwan Relations Act.20 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), set out to
define US-Taiwan relations, as well as provide a mechanism for the US
to supply Taiwan with arms in order to deter Chinese military action.
In accordance with Act 10 of the defense treaty with Taiwan, as the
TRA revoked formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the military alliance was also terminated in 1980.21 However, the United States still
wished to have another anti-communist ally to counter China in the
region. Though the TRA does not give official diplomatic recognition
18
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to Taiwan, it did establish the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT),22 a
corporate, nonprofit entity authorized to manage relations between the
United States and Taiwan. The passage of the TRA holds implications
for the US–PRC relationship as well; the act stipulates that Taiwan’s
future should be determined peacefully, and that the United States may
provide weapons to aid Taiwan’s defense.23 The act is a message to the
PRC that the US will consider any attempt to take Taiwan by force as a
matter of US interest and that the US, whether through arms transfers
or direct military force, will defend Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. In the
Joint Communique published in August of 1982, the United States declared its intention to limit arms sales to Taiwan in order to preserve
normalized US-China relations.24 In 1982, the United States clarified by
passing the “Six Assurances” to Taiwan,25 which stated:
1. The United States would not set a date for termination of
arms sales to Taiwan.
2. The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan
Relations Act.
3. The United States would not consult with China in advance
before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan.
4. The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and
China.
5. The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan, which was, that the question was one to
be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would
not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.
6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

These assurances set a formal guide to US–Taiwan relations, which, in
practice, would ensure that US military support of the island would
22
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continue, and that the island would remain a thorn in the US–PRC relationship. The TRA stands as a key piece in US–Sino relations, providing enough ambiguity for the US to claim that it does not recognize the
ROC, while providing the legal basis to ensure the US does have a de
facto partner in the region.

The Rise of China and the Taiwan Travel Act
Since the passage of the TRA the geopolitical balance of power in
the region has changed. China reformed economically and has grown
to rival the United States,26 and has stated ambitions to be a global power by 2050.27 Not only has China’s economic competition increased, but
US interests in democracy has led to an ideological preference in supporting Taiwan, as Taiwan transitioned from a one-party state under
the KMT to a flourishing democracy by the start of the twenty-first
century. Taiwan now has multiple parties, most notably with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) emerging as an independence leaning
alternative to the KMT.28 Meanwhile, China would infamously crack
down on pro-democracy protests in 198929 and has continued to consolidate the power of the Communist Party,30 this has raised fears that
a Chinese led world order would ignore human rights.31 In recent years,
26
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the United States’ strategy in the region has intensified on containing
China. Shifting away from a main focus on terrorism towards a global
focus on rival powers, in 2017 the National Security Strategy (NSS) was
published, highlighting that China’s rise “risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific”.32 Overall, the United States
has recognized China as a strategic competitor for regional hegemony,
with the US Department of Defense (DOD) labeling China as a rising
threat to national security,33 and with the 2017 NSS being reinforced
with the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for a renewed longterm focus on China.34 In light of this the United States has passed two
more acts directed at Taiwan, the first being the Taiwan Relations Act
Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2014,35 which allowed
for the sale of advanced warships, such as Oliver Hazard Perry-class
frigates, to Taiwan.
The second act was the Taiwan Travel Act of 2018,36 which made
US–Taiwan relations more official by allowing peer-to-peer travel and
meetings between US and Taiwanese officials, including defense officials. This act can be seen as a continuation of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, not only by giving Taiwan the recognition of official visits by
US officials, but by setting a precedent for a more official recognition
of Taiwan. In particular, the act states “visits to a country by United
States Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials are an indicator of the breadth and depth of ties between the United States and
32
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such country,”37strongly implying that the meetings between Taiwan
and the United States could rise to the designation of state to state relations. As the strategic competition between the United States and
China grows, the future of Taiwan and its relations with the United
States are of importance to US national security interests.

The Case for Strong US–Taiwan Relations
The Taiwan Travel Act heralded Taiwan as “a beacon of democracy in Asia,” and that “Taiwan’s democratic achievements inspire many
countries and people in the region.”38 As a leader of the free world in
both political influence and military strength, the United States has a
vested interest in promoting democracy and human rights abroad. Unfortunately, China’s grip on its people has tightened, with concentration
camps for religious minorities39 and the introduction of a social credit
score, a system where rights and privileges are allowed depending on
the deemed amount of loyalty and efficiency of the individual.40 Furthermore, China seeks to exercise economic and military control of the
region through the militarization of islands in the South China Sea,41
and with the Belt and Road Initiative, a transcontinental economic initiative designed to restructure global trade.42 These actions, combined
with PRC President Xi Jinping’s wish to unify China and Taiwan under
the authoritarian regime of the Communist Party, pose a threat to the
island and to the United States economic and political standing in
the world by shifting economic influence to China, thus giving it more
37
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influence over other nations. 43 China continues to hack US companies44 and military networks, and seeks to develop a global navy capable
of challenging the United States.45 With this in mind, the United States
must continue to support the de facto independence of Taiwan to promote a free and multipolar Asia. Without US support of Taiwan and
substantial US military presence in the region, authoritarian regimes such
as China or even North Korea might be emboldened to inflict significant cyber, economic, or military harm on their democratic rivals without fear of US intervention.46 While formal recognition of Taiwan would
be provocative towards China and increase the likelihood of war as the
PRC holds Taiwan as a renegade province, the United States has other
options: it can forward deploy ground and naval assets into the Indo–
Pacific theater, sell more defensive arms and equipment to Taiwan, and
work with Taiwan and other regional partners such as Japan to form a
united diplomatic front against Chinese militarization and expansion.

Conclusion
For now, Taiwan enjoys its freedom and economic success, though
a more ambitious China seeks to eventually unify and dominate the island. While China may not be in the military or economic position to
take on both the United States and Taiwan, it can continue to militarize
and prepare itself for such a conflict. Therefore, out of concern for
human rights and for a strong diplomatic partner, the United States
must not retreat from the Taiwan issue but continue its support of the
island economically and militarily through arms sales and regional deployments. In doing so the United States can send a message that it will
not retreat from democratic ambition, nor authoritarian aggression.
43
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